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 A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN TRUST 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM: WILL THE PAST BE 
PROLOGUE? 
Joseph R. Membrino*±  
 
“If we trace the management of Indian affairs in the Interior Department since 
1849, we find much to call for prompt action to remedy existing evils.”1 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Commission on Indian Trust Administration and Reform (Commission) ap-
proved its final report on December 10, 2013.2 Secretary of the Interior Salazar estab-
lished the Commission by secretarial order3 as an outgrowth of the Cobell v. Salazar set-
tlement.4 The order called for 
 
[A] thorough evaluation of the existing management and administration 
of the trust administration system to support a reasoned and factually 
based set of options for potential management improvements. It also re-
quires a review of the manner in which the Department audits the man-
agement of the trust administration system, including the possible need 
for audits of management of trust assets.5 
 
This paper summarizes the history of federal Indian trust administration beginning 
in the 19th century, focusing on the officials whose duty has been to implement evolving 
                                                          
 * Attorney, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden and Nelson, Cooperstown, N.Y.; formerly, Assistant 
Solicitor, Branch of Water and Power, Division of Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior. 
 ± This article was inspired by the University of Tulsa College of Law’s Ross and Margaret Swimmer Indian 
Affairs Collection. The collection was acquired by the Maybee Legal Information Center in 2013, and is located 
on the first floor. The collection provided a substantial portion of the research for this article, and is intended to 
highlight the collection’s value for students and lawyers interested in the history of Indian trust administration.   
 1. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED TO OBTAIN CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM 
THE SIOUX, GEO. W. MANYPENNY, Chairman, et al., December 18, 1876 (Report of the Sioux Commis-
sion), reprinted in Annual report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the 
year 1876, at 344 [hereinafter 1876 Annual Report]. 
 2. See Dep’t of the Interior, Report of the Commission on Indian Trust and Administration Reform (Dec. 
10, 2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/cobell/commission/upload/Report-of-the-Commission-on-Indian-
Trust-Administration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf.  
 3. See Order from Ken Salazar, United States Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/cobell/commission/upload/2009-12-08-Order-3292.pdf. 
 4. Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, Title I § 22, 124 Stat. 3064, 3066 (2010).  
 5. Salazar, supra note 3, at 1.  
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Indian affairs policy. To a considerable extent the history is told in the words of govern-
ment officials and representatives. 
Since the 19th century, Indian affairs administration has swung between progressive 
ideals and termination policy. The purpose of this review is to illuminate that history to 
inform those charged with developing an effective tribal trust administration system that 
is adapted to tribal sovereignty, self-determination and economic development of natural 
resources that the United States holds in trust for Indian tribes. 
 
In 1876, the year of the “encounter between the troops and Indians on the Little Big 
Horn,”6 Congress directed President Grant to appoint commissioners to meet with the 
Sioux Indians. Their mission: Have the Sioux: (1) abandon all claims to land that lay out-
side their 1868 treaty boundaries; (2) relinquish land within those boundaries, particularly 
the Black Hills; (3) grant non-Indian right of passage over their retained lands; (4) accept 
delivery of all supplies from the government at points on their remaining reservation iden-
tified by the President; and (5) make further agreements with the government that would 
lead “the Indians to become self-supporting.”7 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs ad-
vised the Commission that: 
 
[T]he President is strongly impressed with the belief that the agreement 
which shall be best calculated to enable the Indians to become self-sup-
porting is one which will provide for their removal, at as early a day as 
possible, to the Indian Territory, and that the solution of the difficulties 
which now surround the “Sioux problem” can best be reached by such 
removal.8 
 
Removal, of course, would moot the first four items. 
The Sioux Commission’s charge to reduce or eliminate the Indians’—and the gov-
ernment’s—relationship to their land and resources has long been a staple of Indian policy. 
The commissioners completed the Report within months of the Little Big Horn bat-
tle. Its candor about the government’s role in the “Sioux problem” is striking.9 The Report 
mentioned, but did not dwell on, the emotional impact of the Army’s defeat and loss of 
life; rather, it called the military campaign that led to the Little Big Horn battle a “useless,” 
“dishonorable” and “disgraceful” policy.10 
The Report examined evidence of the breach between the words and deeds of the 
federal government in the conduct of Indian affairs. It contrasted the government’s breach 
                                                          
 6. 1876 Annual Report, supra note 1, at 23. 
 7. Id. at 333.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Report of the Sioux Commission states:  
Of the results of this year’s war we have no wish to speak. It is a heart-rending record of 
the slaughter of many of the bravest of our Army. It has not only carried desolation and 
woe to hundreds of our own hearthstones, but has added to the cup of anguish which we 
have pressed to the lips of the Indian. We fear that when others shall examine it in the light 
of history, they will repeat the words of the officers who penned the report of 1868: The 
results of the year’s campaign satisfied all reasonable men that the war was useless and 
expensive . . . it was dishonorable to the nation and disgraceful to those who originated it. 
Id. at 342-43 (internal quotations omitted).  
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/7
2014] A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN TRUST ADMINISTRATION REFORM 229 
of faith and promise to the Indian tribes with the Indian tribes’ integrity in fulfilling the 
treaty commitments they had made to the United States. The commissioners showed re-
markable courage in this self-criticism. They took the blame. 
A Major-General of the Army told Sioux Commission reporters that he was 
“ashamed longer to appear in the presence of the chiefs of the different tribes of the Sioux, 
who inquire why we do not do as we promised, and in their vigorous language aver that 
we have lied.”11 The Report continues, “Sitting Bull, who had refused to come under treaty 
relations with the Government, based his refusal in these words . . . ‘Whenever you have 
found a white man who will tell the truth, you may return, and I shall be glad to see you.’”12 
Sitting Bull captured in a sentence the breach of law and nature that brought such 
grief to Indian people. More than a century before Sitting Bull spoke those words, Emer 
de Vattel wrote in The Law of Nations13: 
 
It is a settled point in natural law, that he who has made a promise to any 
one has conferred upon him a real right to require the thing promised,—
and, consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation of 
another person’s right, and as evidently an act of injustice as it would be 
to rob a man of his property. The tranquility, the happiness, the security 
of the human race, wholly depend on justice,—on the obligation of pay-
ing a regard to the rights of others. The respect which others pay to our 
rights of domain and property constitutes the security of our actual pos-
sessions; the faith of promises is our security for things that cannot be 
delivered or executed upon the spot. There would no longer be any se-
curity, no longer any commerce between mankind, if they did not think 
themselves obliged to keep faith with each other, and to perform their 
promises. This obligation is, then, as necessary as it is natural and indu-
bitable, between nations that live together in a state of nature, and 
acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order and peace in their 
society. Nations, therefore, and their conductors, ought inviolably to ob-
serve their promises and their treaties.14 
 
The framers of the U.S. Constitution knew The Law of Nations well, and it has 
guided the Supreme Court’s review of constitutional questions.15 Nonetheless, The Law of 
Nations was not a good fit with manifest destiny. 
 
Politically, morally, culturally, legally, and philosophically, America 
had all the tools and rationalizations it needed to remove the human 
blocks to her manifest destiny. In his first annual message to Congress 
                                                          
 11. 1876 Annual Report, supra note 1, at 341. 
 12. Id. 
 13. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. Law 
Booksellers 1861) (1758) [hereinafter THE LAW OF NATIONS].  
 14. Id. at 195-96.  
 15. “In 1775, Benjamin Franklin acknowledged receipt of three copies of a new edition, in French, of Vattel's 
Law of Nations and remarked that the book ‘has been continually in the hands of the members of our Congress 
now sitting . . . .’” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978). 
3
Membrino: A Brief History of Indian Trust Administration Reform: Will the P
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
230 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:227 
in 1817, President James Monroe said: “The earth was given to mankind 
to support the greatest numbers of which it is capable, and no tribe or 
people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is 
necessary for their own support and comfort.” The frontiersmen had 
sounded this theme for two centuries, and Monroe, in the tradition of 
Jefferson, was not remiss in sounding it again for the nineteenth century. 
The period of greatest westward expansion, 1815 to 1860, saw 260 trea-
ties signed. Two hundred and thirty of all the treaties between 1789 and 
1868 involved Indian lands, 76 called for removal and resettlement, and 
nearly 100 dealt with boundaries between Indian and white lands pri-
marily.16 
 
Manifest destiny overwhelmed any inclination government officials may have had 
to “observe their promises and their treaties” with the Indians.17 As a result, by 1872, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs was no longer engaged in reconciling the realities of the 
closing frontier with Vattel’s ideals. 
 
No one certainly will rejoice more heartily than the present Commis-
sioner when the Indians of this country cease to be in a position to dic-
tate, in any form or degree, to the Government; when, in fact, the last 
hostile tribe becomes reduced to the condition of suppliants for charity. 
This is, indeed, the only hope of salvation for the aborigines of the con-
tinent. If they stand up against the progress of civilization and industry, 
they must be relentlessly crushed. The westward course of population is 
neither to be denied nor delayed for the sake of all the Indians that ever 
called this country their home. They must yield or perish; and there is 
something that savors of providential mercy in the rapidity with which 
their fate advances upon them, leaving them scarcely the chance to resist 
before they shall be surrounded and disarmed.18 
 
Vattel addressed that “yield or perish” point of view in the treaty context. 
 
Treaties in which the inequality prevails on the side of the inferior 
power—that is to say, those which impose on the weaker party more 
extensive obligations or greater burdens, or bind him down to oppressive 
or disagreeable conditions,—these unequal treaties, I say, are always at 
the same time unequal alliances; for the weaker party never submits to 
the burdensome conditions, without being obliged also to acknowledge 
                                                          
 16. United States Indian Claims Commission Final Report, H.R. Doc. No. 96-383, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., at 1 
(1980) [hereinafter Ind. Cl. Comm. Final Report].  
 17. THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 13, at 195-96.  
 18. 1872 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, at 9, repro-
duced in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 140 (Francis Paul Prucha ed. 1975) [hereinafter 1872 
Annual Report]. This echoed a century later in an infamous rationalization from the Vietnam War, paraphrased 
as “We had to destroy the village in order to save it.” See Peter Arnett, Major Describes Move, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
8, 1968, at 14.  
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the superiority of his ally. These conditions are commonly imposed by 
the conqueror, or dictated by necessity, which obliges a weak state to 
seek the protection or assistance of another more powerful; and by this 
very step, the weaker state acknowledges her own inferiority. Besides, 
this forced inequality in a treaty of alliance is a disparagement to her, 
and lowers her dignity, at the same time that it exalts that of her more 
powerful ally.19 
 
The Commissioner’s yield-or-perish declaration was, ironically, the view of a public 
official who was benignly disposed toward the Indians and embraced his responsibility as 
guardian of Indian people. The Commissioner was on their side. Arrayed against his point 
of view were those like John M. Chivington, who eight years earlier had rallied anti-Indian 
sentiment, which he used to lead the massacre of Cheyenne at Sand Creek, Colorado: “It 
simply is not possible for Indians to obey or even understand any treaty. I am fully satis-
fied, gentlemen, that to kill them is the only way we will ever have peace and quiet in 
Colorado.”20 
The Sioux Commission wound up its report with recommendations for remedying 
the “existing evils” in the management of Indian affairs. Prominent among them were that:  
 
Our Indian affairs should be managed by an independent department. It 
ought to have at its head one of the first men of the nation, whose rec-
ommendations would be heeded, and who, as a member of the Cabinet, 
could confer with the heads of the War and Interior Departments, and 
devise such wise and just plans as would equally protect the rights of the 
Indians and our own citizens. We are painfully impressed with the fact 
that most of our Indian wars have not only been cruel and unjust to the 
savage, but have largely grown out of conflicts of jurisdiction between 
different departments of the Government. The head of the Department 
of the Interior is already burdened with five distinct bureaus, viz, Pen-
sion, Patent, Land, Education, and Indian. He cannot give to Indian af-
fairs that patient attention which is necessary to success.21 
 
In conclusion, your commission respectfully urge that every effort shall 
be made to secure the ratification and faithful fulfillment of the agree-
ment which we have made by direction of the Government with this 
hapless people. We entered upon this work with full knowledge that 
those who had heretofore made treaties with these Indians had seen their 
promises broken. We accepted the trust as a solemn duty to our country, 
                                                          
 19. THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 13, at 201 (emphasis in original).  
 20. JOSEPH CUMMINS, THE WORLD’S BLOODIEST HISTORY: MASSACRE, GENOCIDE AND THE SCARS THEY 
LEFT ON CIVILIZATION 97 (2010).  
 21. 1876 Annual Report, supra note 1, at 346. A cabinet post for Indian Affairs was not created. A century 
later in 1977, however, a Secretarial Order established the position of Assistant Secretary Indian Affairs that 
reported directly to the Secretary. The roster of Interior agencies has changed but the conflicts remain. In addition 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, today’s Interior Department includes the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and 
Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Geological Survey, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, Minerals Management Service, and Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement. 
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to the perishing, and to God. The Indians trusted us.22 
 
For the Sioux Commission, the takeaway was that the superior power of the federal gov-
ernment, including its plenary constitutional authority over Indian affairs, had not been 
and would not be an effective foundation for government-to-government relations in the 
absence of the trustee being trustworthy.  
In a decade, Indian affairs policy made its way from Indian disarmament to the Gen-
eral Allotment Act.23 The twin goals of allotment were assimilation of Indians to agrarian 
pursuits and disposal of the surplus lands that assimilation would make available to non-
Indians. The allotment era lasted nearly a half-century. During that period: 
 
Indian land holdings were reduced from approximately 137,000,000 
acres to less than 50,000,000 acres. Of the area that remained in Indian 
ownership a large part was desert or mountainside. The grazing land and 
farming land still owned by the Indians had seriously deteriorated as a 
result of overgrazing, the plowing of sod that should never have been 
broken, reckless timber-cutting and the emigration of the topsoil by var-
ious aerial and water routes to points east and west.24 
 
The wealth of the Gilded Age following the Civil War produced philanthropists who 
supported reformers and intellectuals in the progressive era that began with Theodore Roo-
sevelt’s presidency in 1901. They included society leaders drawn to preserving the cultures 
of the many nationalities whose immigrants to the United States peaked in numbers be-
tween 1880 and 1914. John Collier, who had been introduced to New York’s salons and 
the artists’ and writers’ colonies of Santa Fe and Taos, was among those who “discovered” 
the Pueblos’ customs, traditions and culture. Collier concluded that the Pueblo ways 
“demonstrated how organized groups of people, joined together in community life, could 
save mankind from the negative consequences of the industrial age.”25 
However, Indian land issues arose in territorial New Mexico with conflict over 
Pueblo land titles. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had confirmed Spanish land 
grants that had vested title in New Mexico Pueblos to 700,000 acres. Substantial portions 
of that land had been sold to non-Indians who were under the impression that the land was 
freely alienable. The Supreme Court eventually determined that as a condition to entering 
the Union in 1912, New Mexico had to surrender all jurisdiction over Indian lands whose 
title derived from the United States. Nonetheless, “a threat of armed conflict existed be-
tween the Indians, Anglos, and Spanish settlers. In the winter of 1922, violence had been 
narrowly averted . . . .”26 
Collier and his cohort27 used the issues exposed by the Pueblo land dispute to open 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).  
 23. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006)).  
 24. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 86 (1942).  
 25. KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER’S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920-1954, 24 (1977).  
 26. Id. at 28. 
 27. This cohort included the two-million member General Federation of Women’s Clubs, Eastern Association 
on Indian Affairs, New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs, Sunset Magazine, American Indian Defense As-
sociation, and the Chicago Indian Rights Association. These groups found themselves in conflict with the more 
conservative Indian Rights Association and the National Advisory Committee, also known as the Committee of 
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a broad effort for reform in Indian policy that encompassed Indian self-governance, edu-
cation and health care. They challenged Indian affairs administration, which they per-
ceived to have: 
 
[D]eveloped a tendency to impose upon all Indian tribes a uniform pat-
tern of general laws and general regulations. This tendency was com-
monly justified in terms of administrative efficiency and economy, and 
to this justification there was sometimes added the thought that Indian 
treaties; special statutes, and regional differences were all outworn relics 
which had to be sacrificed in the march of national progress. The effect, 
however, of this policy of ignoring the special rights . . . of the tribes 
was to cause tremendous and widespread resentment among the Indians. 
The Indians found Indian and white champions. Protest against mistreat-
ment of the Indian led to many investigations. A survey was conducted 
by the Institute for Government Research at the request of Secretary 
[Hubert] of Interior Work. The results of this study, published under the 
title: “The Problem of Indian Administration,” [Meriam Report]28 gave 
direction for more than a decade to Indian reform.29 
 
  The Meriam Report contributed to the reform movement that ended the allotment 
era, and proved to be the foundation for Indian affairs policy in the New Deal, particularly 
its most significant legislative achievement, the Indian Reorganization Act.30 
 
The Indian Reorganization Act was a flawed product that failed to meet 
the needs of a diversified population, but it did stop land allotment and 
set up mechanisms for self-government, as well as providing needed 
credit facilities and allowing the Indians time to define their role in 
American society.31 
 
The Meriam Report also endorsed the idea of an Indian Claims Commission to redress 
claims born of the fact that “[t]he American right to buy always superseded the Indian 
right not to sell. The white man’s superior power allowed this policy, and pro forma use 
of the treaty conformed to his Anglo-Saxon tradition and concern for the law. For the 
Indian the legality of it all was of little comfort.”32 Congress established the Indian Claims 
Commission in 1946.33 The 176 tribes recognized at that time filed 600 claims for damages 
                                                          
One Hundred, which had been appointed by Interior Secretary Hubert Work. The Committee of One Hundred 
included “educated Indians, missionaries, scientists, conservatives, reformers, and most of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners. Notable guests included Bernard Baruch, the public-spirited capitalist; Oswald Villard, eco-
nomic radical and pacifist; and the fundamentalist politician William Jennings Bryan.” Id. at 49-50.  
 28. Also known as the Meriam Report after the director of the Institute for Government Research, Lewis 
Meriam. 
 29. COHEN, supra note 24, at viii. 
 30. Act of June 18, 1934, § 16, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461).  
 31. PHILP, supra note 25, at 244.  
 32. Ind. Cl. Comm. Final Report, supra note 16, at 1.  
 33. Act of August 13, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (formerly codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-2 (1976), but omitted from current Code because the Indians Claims Commission was 
terminated on Sept. 30, 1978).  
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based on violations of treaties and agreements between the United States and the tribes.34 
Perhaps the best example of the judiciary’s contribution to Indian reform during the 
New Deal is Seminole Nation v. United States.35 The Supreme Court confirmed that a 
fiduciary relationship existed between the government and the Indians who had chosen to 
“yield” rather than “perish.”36 
 
[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent 
upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and some-
times exploited people. In carrying out its treaty obligations with the 
Indian tribes the Government is something more than a mere contracting 
party. Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found expres-
sion in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it 
has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility 
and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it 
in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most ex-
acting fiduciary standards.37  
 
In compiling a list of Indian cases spanning nearly a century, the Department of Justice 
has identified Seminole Nation as one of only two New Deal era Indian law decisions 
deemed to be “significant.”38 
Collier was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. Reaction against the 
direction of his New Deal reforms was swift and intense. “[T]he House Indian Affairs 
Committee became the focus of anti-New Deal sentiment. Members of this Committee 
preferred the abolition of the bureau [of Indian affairs] and the Indians’ rapid assimilation 
into the white community.”39 A lobbying campaign was raised in Washington, D.C., 
against Collier. The American Indian Federation was a prominent adversary. Organized in 
1934 by “Indians from all parts of the country who disliked Collier’s policies, the federa-
tion had a membership of approximately 4,000 persons. Its constitution stressed intertribal 
cooperation and the need to uphold “American civilization and citizenship.”40 Supporters 
and members of the American Indian Federation sought to discredit Collier as tending 
toward “Communism instead of Americanism” and “favor[ing] atheism.”41 Moreover, 
Collier’s American Civil Liberties Union membership proved to the Federation that he 
lacked fitness to hold public office.42 
In the years following World War II, the theme of assimilation took deeper root and 
flowered as termination in the Eisenhower presidency. In 1947 the United States Senate 
                                                          
 34. Ind. Cl. Comm. Final Report, supra note 16, at 5. The Indian Claims Commission terminated in 1978; 
remaining pending claims were transferred to the Court of Claims.  
 35. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).  
 36. Id. at 297.  
 37. Id. at 296-97 (internal citations omitted).  
 38. See Significant Indian Cases, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3104.htm. The other 
New Deal “significant” decision is Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629 (1943). While Seminole Nation 
found federal liability for breach of trust, a year later Creek Nation held the United States blameless as trustee 
for Creek Nation losses.  
 39. PHILP, supra note 25, at 170. 
 40. Id. at 170-171. 
 41. Id. at 172.  
 42. Id. at 172-73. 
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eliminated the Indian Affairs Committee and assigned jurisdiction over Indian affairs to 
the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.43 In 1953 Public Law 280 authorized states, in 
their discretion and without tribal consent, to impose certain state laws on Indians.44 Con-
gress also adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108 announcing the policy of Congress 
to end the ward-guardian relationship and begin termination of certain tribes.45 In that con-
text, the Department of the Interior replaced Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law in 
1958 with a very different version, entitled Federal Indian Law. It cast off the scholarship 
and values of Cohen’s work and stated bluntly in its introduction that “[t]ermination of 
Federal supervision emerges here as a program, not merely an indefinite objective.”46 
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought a revival of progressive values and with it 
the War on Poverty. Termination soon gave way to the rise of self-governance policy in a 
remarkably seamless transition for Indian affairs from the Democratic Johnson Admin-
istration to the Republican Nixon Administration. In 1970, President Nixon formally re-
jected termination policy to promote “self-determination without termination.”47 In 1968 
Congress effectively set aside Federal Indian Law and authorized a revision and reprinting 
of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law. The revision was published in 1982.48 In the 
meantime, the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Solicitor replaced the 1958 Fed-
eral Indian Law with a University of New Mexico facsimile reprint in 1971 of Cohen’s 
1942 Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 
In 1977 the Senate reestablished its Committee on Indian Affairs as a temporary 
select committee. The Committee achieved permanent status in 1984. As noted above, 
1977 also saw the establishment of the office of Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs in 
the Department of the Interior.49 Together these events represented a new direction in the 
administration of Indian affairs. 
The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s produced legislation, administrative actions and judi-
cial decisions on myriad issues affecting tribal rights and Indian policy, and witnessed 
historic battles over reserved water and fishing rights. The successful defense of tribal 
interests during that time owed much to vigorous advocacy by the federal trustee. 
In one case involving water and fishing rights of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 
Interior Department officials attempted to repudiate on appeal the Assistant Secretary for 
Indian Affairs’ position that the Department should exercise its discretion for the benefit 
of the tribe and an endangered species in managing operation of a reclamation project.50 
The Justice Department, which rarely rejects an agency head’s litigation recommendation, 
did just that and prevented the abandonment of the government’s fiduciary duty to the 
tribe.51 
                                                          
 43. See generally, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 831 (1946).  
 44. Pub. L. No. 280 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26; 28 U.S.C. § 1360).  
 45. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).  
 46. United Sates Department of the Interior, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 3 (1958).  
 47. Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, July 8, 1970, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573 (last visited June 25, 2014).  
 48. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ix (2012). A revision of the 1982 edition of the 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law was published in 2005. Id.  
 49. 1872 Annual Report, supra note 18.  
 50. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 51. Political attempts to persuade the federal government to forfeit its trust responsibility played out vividly 
in the Pyramid Lake litigation in a letter from Nevada senator Paul Laxalt to Attorney General William French 
Smith, both of whom were close friends and allies of President Reagan.  
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Protection of tribal interests remained contentious; political pressures tested the 
strength and durability of the federal trust relationship on matters of sovereignty, self-
governance, resources, gaming, land tenure and health care. 
 
A faithful trustee can prevent the Indian interest from being misunder-
stood or undermined, and thereby diminish the possibility that the non-
Indian interest may prevail unfairly. Indian tribes . . . need the federal 
government as an ally and an advocate.52 
 
. . . So long as the federal trustee is absent or neutral in . . . conflicts, the 
effect is much the same as if the government were formally an adversary 
to the tribal interest.53 
 
As the 20th century drew to a close, one event tested the federal trust relationship in 
ways that none had foreseen. It may well prove to be as traumatic for the federal trust 
relationship with Indian country at the beginning of the 21st century as was the transition 
from the New Deal to termination in the middle of the last century. The event was the 
Cobell litigation.54  The court of appeals, in one of the several opinions issued in that liti-
gation, summarized the case as follows: 
 
Beneficiaries of Individual Indian Money trust accounts, as a class, sued 
the Secretary of the Interior and other federal officials, in their official 
capacities, for breach of fiduciary duty in the management of those ac-
counts. In an earlier appeal, we affirmed the district court’s holding that 
the officials, who serve as trustee-delegates for the federal government, 
had breached their fiduciary duties . . . .55 
 
                                                          
Dear Bill 
RE: ALPINE APPEAL 
While it’s fresh on my mind . . . 
--This has immense political overtones out there. All those ranchers--who are ours--feel 
they’re finally going to get some relief from this Administration. To have to go through 
the legal expense and a hassle of an appeal will be a real “downer” for them. 
--On the merits this case should not be appealed. [District Judge] Bruce Thompson wrote 
a helluva sound decision which will not be overturned. These poor ranchers should not be 
compelled to cough up additional legal fees. They’ve contributed substantially enough 
already. 
--If [Solicitor General Rex [Lee]’s shop thinks the Indians can intervene, let them. Even 
have Justice assist in fulfillment of whatever fiduciary responsibility exists, if any. Then 
at least the monkey won’t be on our political backs. 
--Lastly, this would be a badly needed signal--that in a proper case the Attorney General 
will overrule the careerists in Justice who have never been with us and will never be. 
Thanks for listening, old friend. 
Letter from Senator Paul Laxalt to Attorney General William French Smith (Oct. 7, 1981) (emphasis in original). 
Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 1, 20 n.76 (1992).  
 52. Membrino, supra note 51, at 21.  
 53. Id. at 23.  
 54. See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 55. Id. at 1133. 
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Congress authorized billions of dollars to settle Cobell in 2010.56 With liability determined 
and damages paid, Indian beneficiaries fairly could expect their trustee to resume the fi-
duciary relationship and put the breach of trust behind them. Whether that expectation will 
be met is an open question. 
To understand why requires looking behind the court of appeals bland summary of 
the Cobell case. Cobell involved rancorous, 14-year litigation that spanned three presiden-
cies and included contempt proceedings against cabinet and sub-cabinet officials in both 
Democratic and Republican administrations. Moreover, ten years into the case, a court of 
appeals made an extraordinarily rare decision to remove the presiding judge after accept-
ing the federal government’s argument that no judge who “has viciously and baselessly 
denounced a cabinet department and its leadership as villainous racists could properly 
oversee its activities and adjudicate further claims.”57 Among statements by the removed 
judge were descriptions of “Interior as an agency whose ‘spite’ has led it to turn its ‘wrath’ 
on trust beneficiaries and engage in ‘willful misconduct,’ ‘iniquities,’ ‘scandals,’ ‘dirty 
tricks,’ and ‘outright villainy.’”58 The court of appeals concluded that “an objective ob-
server is left with the overall impression that the district court’s professed hostility to In-
terior has become so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.”59 
No court should have had to reach such judgments about federal agencies charged 
with responsibility for Indian affairs had those agencies been faithful to Executive Order 
13175.60 Issued by President Clinton in the midst of the Cobell litigation, the Executive 
Order included this instruction: “Agencies shall respect Indian tribal self-government and 
sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that 
arise from the unique legal relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal 
governments.”61 The ideal of Executive Order 13175 foundered, however, on the reality 
of the Cobell litigation. 
In the Cobell era, both political parties and a generation of cabinet officials, policy 
appointees, agency employees and government attorneys no longer acted as if moved—as 
Interior Department Solicitor Nathan Margold put it in his 1940 introduction to the Hand-
book of Federal Indian Law—to “appreciate the significance of the problem of Indian 
rights for the cause of democracy here in the United States and throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.”62 
Federal officials, at every level and across administrations, have reoriented them-
selves as trustees. In transactions with Indian tribes over their trust resources, these offi-
cials now insist on outcomes that circumscribe or eliminate the trust relationship. One 
means to that end is the decision by recent administrations to frame their negotiations with 
tribes in terms of a decision in a 1968 decision also deemed “significant” by the Depart-
ment of Justice. The case, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. 
                                                          
 56. See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010).  
 57. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 58. Id. at 333. 
 59. Id. at 335 (internal citations omitted).  
 60. Executive Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-11-09/pdf/00-29003.pdf.       
 61. 65 Fed. Reg. at 67250.  
 62. COHEN, supra note 24, at vii. 
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United States,63 arose in the termination era when courts were addressing Indian claims 
against the United States for compensation. The Fort Berthold court observed: 
 
Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as trustee for the benefit of the 
Indians, exercising its plenary powers over the Indians and their prop-
erty, as it thinks is in their best interests, and (2) exercise its sovereign 
power of eminent domain, taking the Indians’ property within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In any given situation 
in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian people, it must have 
acted either in one capacity or the other. Congress can own two hats, but 
it cannot wear them both at the same time. 
 
. . . Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give the Indians the 
full value of the land and thus merely transmutes the property from land 
to money, there is no taking. This is a mere substitution of assets or 
change of form and is a traditional function of a trustee.64  
 
  In effect, as a defense to a tribe’s monetary claim, the United States took the Fifth 
Amendment compensation standard and weakened its application to the federal trustee’s 
actions in disposing of tribal lands on the theory that the value was close enough to be fair 
even if it wouldn’t have passed muster under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.65 
Federal negotiators in the Cobell era have converted substitution theory from a 
shield to a sword for use in preempting future claims and limiting the trust relationship. 
The Gila River Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 2004 is an example.66 
That act authorized the federal government to implement an agreement to settle Indian 
reserved water rights claims. (It was enacted a year after the Secretary of the Interior had 
weathered charges by the Cobell plaintiffs that she was in criminal contempt of court and 
had committed fraud on the court.)67  Section 206 of the act states: “The benefits realized 
by the Community, Community members, and allottees under this title shall be in complete 
replacement of and substitution for, and full satisfaction of, all claims . . . .”68 
The act occupies 36 pages in the Statutes at Large; 14 pages—40 percent—are waiv-
                                                          
 63. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968).  
 64. Id. at 691. The Supreme Court adopted the Fort Berthold analysis in United States v. Sioux Nation of 
Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).  
 65. The 2005 edition of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law provides this commentary on Fort Berthold: 
The ruling is troubling because it deprives Indian nations of a remedy if it can be shown 
that Congress made a “good faith effort” to provide full value for the land. This defense is 
not available in the non-Indian context; there, when Congress takes property, it must pay 
fair market value, not merely make a good faith effort to do so. Rather than a subjective 
test based on congressional intent of good faith, the takings clause in the non-Indian con-
test applies an objective test based on the market value of the land. If Congress effectively 
deprives a tribe of control of its property, full compensation should be paid. 
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1027 n.38 (2005).   
 66. Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3499 (2004).  
 67. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 68. Gila River Indian Cmty. Water Rights Settlement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. at 3507 
(2004).  
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ers and limitations on the federal trust relationship with the Gila River Indian Commu-
nity.69 In a statute for the benefit of Indians, Congress saw to it that 40 percent of its text 
protected the trustee from the beneficiary. The Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement is 
another example where substitution is used to seal the deal.70 
“Indian Country Today” recently published a statement by five southern California 
Mission Indian Bands about their water rights struggles with the federal trustee.71 
 
[T]he La Jolla, Pala, Pauma, Rincon and San Pasqual Bands, located in 
northern San Diego County, are asking the federal government to settle 
a 100-year old problem created when it gave away their water rights. 
 
The tribes want to know why senior staff of the departments of Interior 
and Justice are ignoring the President’s policy to honor federal trust re-
sponsibilities. . . . 
 
“Central to the federal refusal is an attempt to avoid or limit their trust 
obligations to the tribes and future protection of our water supply,” said 
Bo Mazzetti, vice president of the San Luis Rey Indian Water Authority, 
and chairman of the Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians. 
 
. . . Local lawmakers say they want the federal government to approve 
the agreement. “It is in the interest of all parties, including the federal 
government, to enact a comprehensive settlement with respect to Indian 
water rights on the San Luis Rey River,” said Rep. Darrell Issa in a state-
ment. “The Departments of Justice and Interior should move forward 
immediately to achieve a final settlement agreement.” 
 
The basis for the policy of congressional settlement of Indian water 
rights disputes is that in almost all situations, the federal government 
created the conflict between tribes and their neighbors by encouraging 
and subsidizing water development for non-Indians with little or no re-
gard for Indian water rights and the Winters Doctrine. 
 
. . . “So the federal agencies, which really created the dispute in the first 
place, now have become the stumbling block to the final settlement, and 
it is a serious problem,” said retired Rep. Packard, who has remained as 
a consultant for the tribes and the two water agencies. 
 
He believes the federal government wants to rid itself of its responsibil-
                                                          
 69. Id. at 3507 (satisfaction of claims); id. at 3508 (waiver and release of claims).  
 70. Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 409, 124 Stat. 3097, 3108 
(2010).  
 71. San Luis Rey Water Rights Challenge – A 100 Year Old Struggle, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK (Mar. 22, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/03/22/san-luis-rey-water-rights-
challenge-100-year-old-struggle-148305.  
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ity to provide water to the reservations, including helping to defend In-
dian water rights.72 
 
Yet another example is the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA).73 The 
rights and interests claimed by Oregon and California, federal agencies, Indian tribes, local 
governments, farm communities, hydropower generation, and environmental interests in 
Klamath River water exceed the available water supply. Dramatic and tragic evidence of 
this emerged when in 2001 the federal Bureau of Reclamation allocated nearly all of its 
irrigation water supply to benefit protected species of fish and associated Indian rights. 
Irrigators protested, engaged in civil disobedience and sued the government without suc-
cess. In 2002, however, the Bureau of Reclamation succumbed to political pressure, in-
cluding intervention by Vice-President Cheney.74 The Bureau changed course; it ignored 
the needs of the fish and the prior rights of Klamath Basin Indian tribes and allocated water 
to irrigation. Tens of thousands of fish in that fall’s spawning migration died in severely 
degraded habitat conditions. It was the largest adult salmon kill in history. 
The KBRA is the product of negotiations that consumed years. Its goal was to rec-
oncile competing demands on the Klamath River. The Hoopa Valley Tribe participated in 
the KBRA negotiations but after examining the science used as the basis for water alloca-
tion in the agreement, the Tribe concluded that the fishery restoration outcomes could not 
be realized and decided not to be a party to the KBRA. 
Non-federal parties signed the KBRA on February 18, 2010, though federal agency 
officials could not become parties without enactment of authorizing legislation. Legisla-
tion for that purpose was introduced in the 112th Congress.75 Both the KBRA and the pro-
posed legislation would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to ignore the Hoopa Valley 
Tribe’s decision and substitute the Secretary’s judgment for the Tribe’s in disregard of 
Executive Order 13175, which President Obama had reaffirmed just four months earlier.76 
The Hoopa Valley Tribe opposed the legislation, which did not pass.   
The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Affiliated Tribes of 
Northwest Indians (ATNI) have noted these developments in the Obama Administration 
and enacted resolutions expressing disagreement with the policy they represent.77 
                                                          
 72. Id.  
 73. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement for the 
Sustainability of Public and Trust Resources and Affected Communities (2010), archived at http://klamathresto-
ration.gov/sites/klamathrestoration.gov/files/Klamath-Agreements/Klamath-Basin-Restoration-Agreement-2-
18-10signed.pdf (last visited June 25, 2014). 
     74.   See Klamath Basin Fish Kill, HISTORY COMMONS, http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?time-
line=the_bush_administration_s_environmental_record&bush_env_specific_issues_and_cases=bush_env_kla-
mathBasin (last visited June 25, 2014).  
 75. See H.R. 3398, 112th Cong. (2010); S. 1851, 112th Cong. (2010).  
 76. On Nov. 5, 2009, President Barack Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum directing each agency to 
submit a detailed plan of action describing how the agency will implement the policies and directives of Execu-
tive Order 13175. See WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-tribal-consul-
tation-signed-president.  
 77. See Support for Sovereign Authority of Tribes to Enter into Water Agreements, NCAI Resolution #PSP-
09-051 (2009), available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_APWmAwdreCweisQhtiVZDJWZO-
DRdlHSgyFtKHInbpIMaYQytbvW_PSP-09-051_final.pdf (“NCAI does hereby oppose any policy of the U.S. to 
terminate the rights of, or impose adverse consequences upon, a tribe that chooses to retain its water rights instead 
of settling on terms desired by the Federal Government.”); Support for Executive Order Prohibiting Federal 
Employees from Advocating Reduction of Trust Responsibility, NCAI Resolution #SAC-12-017, available at 
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In the 113th Congress, after substantial revisions that further eroded tribal trust fish-
ery benefits, the Klamath settlement legislation was reintroduced as S. 2379, and again 
referred to the Energy and Natural Resources Committee without an opportunity for re-
view in the Indian Affairs Committee. When the Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
failed to approve S. 2379, the bill was reintroduced as S. 2727, which was assigned to the 
Finance Committee. Both bills remained pending as of the publication of this article. 
To date, leaders from 17 Tribes in 6 States have written to the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources and Indian Affairs Committees opposing the provisions of the legisla-
tion that would unilaterally compromise the rights of the Hoopa Valley Tribe.78 They view 
the legislation as an unacceptable policy precedent for similar erosions of their rights and 
sovereignty.  
On August 20, Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell published Secretarial Order 
333579 in response to the Commission’s December 2013 Final Report and Recommenda-
tions. Order 3335 sets out seven guiding principles80 to which all Interior agencies are 
                                                          
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_OiYtinseQhMNeZeVwIxrroYPRfbsDvKYDaLjIlmRPPRbBP-
BEzKf_SAC-12-017.pdf (“a disturbing trend is apparent in actions of employees of the Interior Department who 
advocate reduction or limitation of trust responsibilities such as placing a five year limit on the time during which 
tribal funds may be held in trust; and . . .employees of the Department of Justice have advocated positions in 
court that would improperly limit or terminate the United States’ trust obligations concerning federal manage-
ment of tribal trust funds and resources; and . . . employees of the Interior Department have drafted and advocated 
legislation which would terminate the United States’ trust obligation pertaining to protections of tribal trust re-
sources and senior tribal water rights. NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the NCAI opposes the action 
of federal employees to limit or abolish federal trust responsibilities to protect tribal funds and natural resources; 
and . . . the NCAI hereby petitions the President to issue an Executive Order barring federal employees from 
proposing or advocating reductions of the United States’ existing trust responsibilities; and . . . the NCAI hereby 
petitions relevant Congressional committees to exercise their oversight authority to help ensure that the Executive 
Branch brings the same honor to fulfilling and defending its trust responsibilities that the United States had when 
these commitments were first made so many years ago as the foundation of the federal-tribal government-to-
government relationship[.]”). See also ATNI Resolution #09-63 (on file with author) and ATNI Resolution #12-
64, available at http://www.atnitribes.org/sites/default/files/res_12_64.pdf, to the same effect as the NCAI reso-
lutions.  
 78. See, e.g., Letter in opposition to S. 2379 from Gaa Ching Ziibi Daawaa Anishinaabek Little River Band 
of Ottawa Indians, to John Tester, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, John Barasso, Vice 
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Mary L. Landrieu, Chair of the U.S. Senate Commit-
tee on Energy and Natural Resources, Lisa Murkowski, Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, Ron Wyden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Orrin G. Hatch, 
Minority Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Aug. 14, 2014) (on file with the Tulsa Law Review). 
Similar letters have been sent by the Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakama Nation, Nisqually Tribal Council, Quileute Tribal Council, Organized Village of Kake, Bear River Band 
of Rohnerwille Rancheria, etc. (these and similar letters on file with the Tulsa Law Review).  
 79. U.S. Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell, Order No. 3335, Reaffirmation of the Federal Trust Respon-
sibility to Federally Recognized Indian Tribes and Individual Indian Beneficiaries (Aug. 20, 2014) available at, 
http://www.doi.gov/news/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=561791 and  
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc1-027607.pdf.  
 80. Principle 1: Respect tribal sovereignty and self-determination, which includes the right of Indian tribes 
to make important decisions about their own best interests.  
  Principle 2: Ensure to the maximum extent possible that trust and restricted fee lands, trust resources, and 
treaty and similarly recognized rights are protected.  
  Principle 3: Be responsive and informative in all communications and interactions with Indian tribes and 
individual Indian beneficiaries.  
  Principle 4: Work in partnership with Indian tribes on mutually beneficial projects.  
  Principle 5: Work with Indian tribes and individual Indian beneficiaries to avoid or resolve conflicts to 
the maximum extent possible in a manner that accommodates and protects trust and restricted fee lands, trust 
resources, and treaty and similarly recognized rights. 
  Principle 6: Work collaboratively and in a timely fashion with Indian tribes and individual Indian bene-
ficiaries when evaluating requests to take affirmative action to protect trust and restricted fee lands, trust re-
sources, and treaty and similarly recognized rights. 
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instructed to adhere.    
CONCLUSION 
The statutes and executive orders that introduced and implemented self-determination and 
self-governance remain a strong foundation for an effective fiduciary relationship between 
Indian tribes and the federal government. To fulfill their promise, Congress and the Exec-
utive Branch need to heed the alarms sounded by NCAI and ATNI in the aftermath of 
Cobell about the defensiveness and unilateralism in policy-making that are eroding the 
trust relationship and bringing about the subordination of tribal rights in trust assets to 
other interests. These elements in the ongoing conduct of Indian affairs programs cannot 
be reconciled with the policies announced by Congress and successive presidents in recent 
decades.  
It remains to be seen whether Secretarial Order 3335 represents a new era in Indian 
trust administration. For the Congress and the Executive Branch to respond to NCAI, 
ATNI, and the Commission with clear and strong corrective action will take far less cour-
age than predecessor commissions displayed in assessing the causes of conflict and car-
nage on the frontier, confronting the black-listing and red-baiting of progressive reforms 
in the era of the New Deal and Cold War, and reversal of termination policy in the last 
decades of the 20th century.  
                                                          
  Principle 7: When circumstances warrant, seek advice from the Office of the Solicitor to ensure that 
decisions impacting Indian tribes and/or individual Indian beneficiaries are consistent with the trust responsibil-
ity. See Id.  
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